Commercial Real Estate RefinanceRefinancing of commercial real estate
Lender tradition remains intact, relatively untouched by creativity from borrower and their attorney when business goes south. Continuing to address the collection system, its outdated regulatory framework, pledge priorities and (at least in New York) property taxes.
As our documentation continues to evolve, we are able to cope with the subtleties of these often unwieldy and unwieldy approaches. However, the structure of the deals and the documentation stayed more or less the same. Initially, the ever-increasing regulation imposed on banking institutions has opened them up to less heavily controlled - shady - lenders, whether individuals or companies such as venture capitalists or Hedge Fund companies, in order to provide the first mortgages, a transaction once held by them.
There were no significant alternatives to these creditors in real estate 20 years ago. Most commercial real estate credits and practically every investment category are sought after. Regulatory measures do not restrict the use of other creditors. They are also not necessarily as cautious as konservative bankers about a bubbling real estate market that is about to explode.
Providing more credit income - albeit at higher costs - they are competing aggressive for almost any type of credit. Alternatives creditors are not afraid of the "loan to own" endgame approach in a cycle real estate environment that may be headed for a smooth land. Loans are only a variant of an acquisitions, with the option of getting their cash back with interest as an alternate, quite reasonable option.
In the real estate financing sector, hedging trusts, venture equity trusts, mortgages and real estate developers' credit providers - non-regulatory, risk-tolerant and opportunist - have become a flash in the pan. This is changing the way real estate credit is granted and used. Half a century after the onset of the global economic downturn, the supervisory authorities have imposed new risk-based regulatory requirements for highly volatile commercial real estate ("HVCRE") in accordance with Basel III with effect from 1 January 2015 as a further strain on them.
This new rule applies enormously to acquisitions, building and redevelopment credits - and thus to most new developments. Considering a credit as HVCRE, it is extremely costly for any traditionally established institution of credit. That is completely at odds with the normal rationale of mortgage financing, which regards property valuation as part of the borrower's'equity' in the scheme.
The rules of the Croatian Financial Markets Commission (HVCRE) also state that the borrowers must keep their liquid investments in the projects "for the duration of the loan" - whatever that means (completion? stabilization? transformation into continuous funding? maturity?). All of this constitutes a complete "reset" of mortgages, another likely cause to anticipate that hedging trusts and venture capital will displace commercial banking in this world.
Maybe a real estate development company president will bring some practicability to these new regulations, but it's too early to say that. Industrial real estate creditors and attorneys also have to address workout and foreclosure issues that have faded and flown over the years. Even though all documentation and business structure must fully address the potential failure of the borrowers, the true incidence of failure has remained low even during the current credit crunch.
Not so long ago, default often resulted in insolvency, where the lender's pledge was "constrained" to the extent of the temporary value of the security, with a potential plus being the " reorganised " borrower. However, the creditor's pledge was not only "forced" into the "reorganised" position, but also into the "reorganised" position. Over the last ten or two years, this has become almost an irrelevance issue because creditors have learnt to require real estate lending customers to consent to take full advantage of the credit if a debtor has gone bankrupt or done other "bad things".
" Up until then, real estate insolvencies of individual assets were a way of living in non-performing real estate. Insolvency was petitioned - it was a mandatory (some would say automatic) borrowers policy - to prevent sequestration or stop enforcement, often for years, and to cause great distress to creditors. The " protective screen " of insolvency became a weapons for completely non-recourse credits, which was often and very successfully used in courts and hearings.
Today we see these guarantees in practically every commercial real estate credit, even if they are otherwise non-recourse. Insofar as the court enforces this complete recovery, the carve-out guarantee has basically removed the insolvencies of real estate of individual assets. Apart from full insolvency, carve-out guarantees have changed more in the last 20 years than in any other area of mortgages and negotiation.
Then, these ballons exploded in the faces of the sponsors when opportunist borrowers claimed completely insignificant propositions about carve-out adhesion, often successfully. A lot of creditors have reduced carve-outs to a more reasonable amount. Every borrowers now knows that the first talk about every credit application should directly address the carve-outs according to price, revenue and maturity.
Borrower and guarantor who have listened to the court's vote on the side of the lender (a "contract is a contract" even if the results do not make sense) have concentrated on "intentionality". "A number of jurisdictions have ruled that a subordinated mortgages or a mechanic's right of lien could go up to the levels of an improper assignment (or encumbrance) that triggers full recovery.
However, as always, the levy continues to influence lending documentation and structure. Worrying evasion of taxes resulted in the introduction of the FAT Act, which introduced new demands on overseas banking and a somewhat new terminology in credit contracts. Here, too, FATCA has made no changes to the way commercial real estate financing works.
Creditors and other real estate stakeholders seem to have become better at understand, assess and quantify risk to the environment. We have also seen new trends, the EU's "bail-in" rules to cope with banking bankruptcy (more jargon for credit agreements) and "PACE" lifts (a new ban) for real estate valued with cleanergies. In real estate finance, too, finance innovation such as swing coverage and more sophisticated pre-payment formulae have prevailed as they continue to move closer to general business finance.
And then there is the pile of money that is increasingly full of various creditors, interests and business. Today, unlike 20 years ago, many large real estate financings often involve debts that go far beyond the initial traditionally available mortgages. Commercial real estate financing was much more traditionally and simply twenty years ago. There was a security for the credit in the form of a hypothec on the land.
Creditor kept the mortgages in his portfolios. Maybe, just maybe, there was a junior subpoena on the land. At the time, we hardly even recall a Meczanine fief. 20 years ago, when no one had ever listened to the "stack of capital", we analogized the credit line described in our article on Meczanine to the second floor in a shopping mall accessible via an elevator.
This was the "amount" between the first security right over real property and the borrower's own capital. Every stand on this front five years ago has disappeared, especially when the often quite rightful creditors of the first pledge will not cover the sponsor's need for loans. This should also continue to be a key component of real estate financing.
The participations in the sponsoring company are also cut up and thrown into dice as well as pawned and supplemented. A loan is granted as a loan. Probably the greatest shift in real estate lending, whether structural or multi-stage, was the development of the interchange editor arrangement. It was the lead creditor who monitored the security and enforcement.
Instead, the second pledgee had a place at the desk in a compulsory execution, refinancing or selling of the real estate, and if he was fortunate, he would have the "opportunity" to offer in the compulsory selling of the first hypothec. Often the arrangement between the seniors' and juniors' debts said that if the juniors' debts wanted to appeal, they would have to "borrow" or pay back the seniors' loans.
Stuyvesant's landmark and important landmark ruling has altered the countryside and the agreement between creditors in the equity pile and their right to enforce. The subordinated creditor no longer needs to repair all default (i.e. pay back the expedited first ranking loan) before asserting its appeal. For securitized financing, the junior mortgagee monitors credit execution.
Bargaining between creditors, involvement in the collateralisation and decision-making of real estate, legal redress - all new, all much more demanding than 20 years ago. In addition to providing credit in the shape of demzanine credit, the even more opportunist preferential capital has become a much more widespread type of finance than 20 years ago. Today, real estate credits (whether to achieve ROI or equity) are often organized as preferential capital in the sponsoring institution.
There are some hybrids where a privately held "lender" grants a company's members a mortgage and its subsidiary purchases privileged capital from the investor. In this way, the above-mentioned hedge fund providers potentially generate the above-average returns their investor would like. Twenty years ago, they weren't in commercial real estate.
There is no doubt that the structure of real estate financing, subscribers, underwriting, loan improvement and legal redress have undergone important changes in other ways. It is enough to say that real estate financing today goes far beyond the years. For us, real estate financing remains an exciting - and zerebral - investment category.